3/6/85 R5650-2

JAPAN · ECONOMIC · INSTITUTE

JEI

REPORT

NO. 8A March 1, 1985

ARMS CONTROL TALKS: AN INTERVIEW WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Summary

American and Soviet negotiators will meet in March to discuss a new agreement to limit the growth of nuclear weapons. Although this issue tends to be viewed in terms of bilateral security, the results could have a profound effect on European and Asian regional security as well.

JEI political analyst Michael Chinworth recently spoke with Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since 1983, to explore the impact of these negotiations on Japan and the potential role of the Japanese government in concluding or implementing a new agreement.

Q. What mechanics exist, if any, to keep Japan involved and informed in these negotiations?

A. We have done that in ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] to a great extent, and the State Department does as well, because of Japan's interests, especially in the INF realm -- the intermediate nuclear force realm.

We have had Japanese visitors pretty constantly. I know that our public affairs department works closely with the Japanese press. When we were in Japan last July we had quite a few meetings with the Foreign Ministry and the foreign minister. We had press interviews and a roundtable discussion with some experts.

So we have made a tremendous effort. We understand that Japan's security is affected, and not only in the strategic realm but also in the INF realm. The Japanese people and government have been seriously disturbed by the Soviet Union's build-up in SS-20 deployments.

Q. Would you elaborate on that?

A. I think it was true a few years ago that the Japanese did not realize how much the Soviet SS-20 missiles endangered their security. But from my meetings with Japanese -- and I have been there five or six times -- I'm getting a feeling that security issues are becoming more and more prominent in Japan. I think that is all to the good.

Something like the SS-20 triggers a lot of discussion and concern. It is not at a level where people are hysterical, and they shouldn't be hysterical about it. But it's a concern that is a readily identifiable part of the overall Soviet military build-up in the Pacific that has been so ominous through the years. That includes the occupation of the Northern Islands and the stationing of a battalion there; the number of naval deployments going up all the time by the Soviet Union; and the use of Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang for air and naval facilities by the Soviet Union.

Q. In 1980, you wrote an article that was highly critical of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat and the corresponding need for expanding its own defense. Judging from your comments now, is it safe to assume that you believe the conditions that you described then have changed significantly?

A. Yes, I do think that Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat have changed since 1980. In part this is due to the greatly expanded Soviet presence in and around the Sea of Japan. It is also due to Japanese concern over Soviet deployments of SS-20s to eastern U.S.S.R. Finally, the downing of KAL 007 had a significant impact on Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union.

Since 1980 the Japanese have taken a number of initiatives to improve defense cooperation with the United States. These include increased defense spending, co-production of military equipment, and frequent consultations. Soviet expansion of its naval forces and modernization of its naval aviation are obvious threats to Japan's strategic position, as well as those of China, Korea and Taiwan.

Q. What about the United States? Is there a corresponding realization of growing Japanese awareness?

A. Very much so. I have been in meetings on INF with the president when Japanese concerns have been expressed, and Japanese considerations have been factored into presidential decisionmaking in this realm. I know that at critical junctures in the INF situation in 1983, the president personally wrote Prime Minister Nakasone to elicit his views on what we should do at the negotiating table. Prime Minister Nakasone responded and his views were important.

The JEI REPORT (ISSN 0744-6489) is published weekly for $40 per year by the Japan Economic Institute of America, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C. POSTMASTERS: Send address changes to JEI, 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Q. What other specific steps beyond just moral support could the Japanese government take in order to further the negotiations?

A. I think the Japanese government, because of the position it has taken on the three nuclear "nos" -- no possession, manufacture or storage of nuclear weapons, has a very strong moral standing in the world. I think that they can use that moral standing to have the Soviets understand that the moral position in this world is to eliminate an entire class of weapons systems: the intermediate-range nuclear force. The moral position in this world is to really reduce stragetic nuclear weapons, ballistic missile warheads; to get away from the destabilizing systems in place today; and to really make progress in arms control. We want to eliminate chemical weapons altogether and make progress as well in the nuclear testing issue. For example, the president, at the United Nations, offered to have an exchange of experts to calibrate tests at each side's test sites. I think items like that are very, very helpful, and Japan is particularly well suited to make that kind of moral argument.

Q. Don't you think that a little more than moral outrage is necessary to convince the Soviets to agree to an arms pact?

A. Yes, I do. But moral persuasion is still important in the court of world opinion. Success in achieving balanced and verifiable arms control agreements that make a real contribution to global stability and security requires patience, persistence and unity. It requires allied cohesion, strong economies, and public support in democracies.

We are making serious and far-reaching efforts to reduce nuclear and conventional arms, to achieve a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and to forge new bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures. The pursuit of a more stable peace through a vigorous arms reductions program is an essential part of collective efforts to strengthen Western security and will remain among the highest priorities of the Reagan administration.

Q. What about Japanese conventional defense spending? Does the current expansion in Japan affect the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate with the United States, or at least provide some substance behind Japan's moral arguments?

A. Increased military spending demonstrates to the Soviets that the Western allies are seriously committed to the defense of their interests and the freedom of their people. Military power -- Soviet military power -- can and is used for political goals. The Soviets, as elsewhere, want greater political and psychological influence over the area around Japan. By ensuring adequate defense efforts, the Western alliance is strengthened and the Soviet perception of what they can obtain by force will be lessened and that will make them more willing to negotiate.

Q. Will these negotiations affect Japanese-Soviet economic or political relations?

A. That's up to the Japanese to decide. I think that the Japanese people obviously have a stake in good arms control agreements. Our security is very intricately tied to Japan's security. And so, I would think that if we could get an arms control agreement that would make the risk for war less likely, the

Japanese would be a big beneficiary in this, as would we. I also think that the Russian people, and the people around the world, would be a beneficiary of such an arms control agreement.

Q. Could Soviet-Japanese economic ties be enhanced by eliminating or significantly reducing security concerns? For example, do you think it could lead to something like Siberian exploration for gas and oil?

A. That is something the Japanese would have to work out with the Soviets. I'm in the exploration business insofar as I can try to explore for good arms control proposals, but not for oil.

Q. Without getting too deeply into the "Star Wars" element, how are the Soviets interested in these negotiations over outer space weapons and how do they affect Japanese security?

A. What the president would like to do is move away from such heavy reliance as we have had over the years for keeping the peace on the threat of mutual annihilation. He wants to see if there isn't a bigger role for defending ourselves and our allies against certain types of nuclear weapons attacks and eventually against all types of nuclear weapons attacks; to change the equation in some way so as to make defense -- defending our people, our allies, our national assets, our retaliatory force -- a better way of preserving the peace than to rely purely on the threat of mutual annihilation.

I think it is a research program worth looking into and worth discussing with the Soviets. What the president would like to do is to enter into a very broad and deep discussion with the Soviet Union on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces. The last time we had such a discussion with them was before the ABM Treaty and SALT I.

Q. Some observers suggest that popular support in Japan for arms control is very strong, but at the same time there is not a great deal of faith in the political leaders entrusted with reaching these agreements. What are your perceptions?

A. My perceptions are that the Japanese hope that arms control can lead to a more stabilizing situation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that they would be among the beneficiaries of that. I felt that sentiment was very strong among the Japanese people when I was there last July, and I share it very much.

Q. The president and Prime Minister Nakasone met in January on trade and security issues. How high up on their agenda was arms control?

A. I know it's high up on the president's agenda. He's spent an enormous amount of time recently dealing with the subject; we've had several meetings recently with him. He's just devoting an enormous amount of time and effort to the subject, as I believe it's due. I know that he share with Prime Minister Nakasone a sense of the critical importance of preserving peace.

Q. To what extent were Japanese security questions explicitly raised in the January Geneva talks with the Soviets?

A. As I said, when President Reagan met with Prime Minister Nakasone, one of the important topics of discussion was nuclear arms control and the global aspects of the problem. In Geneva, we expressed to the Soviets our concern over the growth of intermediate-range nuclear forces and these -- most notably the SS-20s -- are of serious concern to Japan and our other Asian friends and allies. We expect that as a part of our discussions as negotiations actually begin, issues, such as nuclear testing, which are of particular concern to Japan will also be addressed.

Q. Given the fact that Japan has a big stake in these talks, has the U.S. government given any consideration to formally including the Japanese in some fashion in these negotiations?

A. We will keep them informed as we go along on the negotiations, and I think that is a very proper role, and an important one. They are participating in the Committee on Disarmament, helping us to rid the world of chemical weapons, and that has to be, in my perception, one of the top priorities in arms control in the coming four years. They have also participated very actively in the United Nations First Committee. We work with them in these forums very closely.

Q. Will there be any Japanese role in enforcing a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement?

A. Well, I think that high on the agenda in the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons is the whole question of verification, enforcement and compliance, and we have been working with the Japanese in this area. They have an excellent delegation to the Committee on Disarmament. They do very good work.

* * * * * *

Appendix 1: An Arms Control Glossary

ABM System - Antiballistic missile, a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements during flight.

Cruise Missile - A guided missile using aerodynamic lift that sustains powered flight through the atmosphere to its target.

Dual-Capable Weapons - Those systems capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Flexible Response - A strategy to deter and, should deterrence fail, to counter aggression at varying levels with appropriate forces.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) - A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges defined in SALT I and II as ranges in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) - Land-based missiles and aircraft with ranges/combat radius between short-range nuclear forces and 5,500 km that are capable of striking targets beyond the general region of the battlefield but not capable of intercontinental range.

Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) - Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate target.

Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) - The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile which is equipped with multiple warheads but which does not have the capability of independently directing the reentry vehicles to separate targets.

Quantitative Limitations - Limits on the number of weapons systems in certain categories, as distinct from qualitative limitations on weapons capabilities.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) - Land-based missiles, rockets and artillery that are capable of striking only targets in the general region of the battlefield.

Special Consultative Group (SCG) - The NATO forum for review of the course of the INF negotiations and for consultation on any U.S. steps in those talks.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) - A permanent U.S.-Soviet commission established in accordance with the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to which it is assigned responsibility.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) - A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine.

Throw-Weight - The useful weight placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile.

Source: U.S. Department of State

Appendix 2: An Arms Control Chronology

1959	Antarctic Treaty.
1963	June 20: "Hotline" agreement; August 14: Japan signs Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
1967	Outer Space Treaty. Treaty of Tlatelolco.
1968	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
1971	February 11: Seabed Arms Control Treaty; September 30: "Accidents Measures" agreement.
1972	Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
1974	July 3: Underground nuclear testing limited; November 23: Joint SALT II communique.
1976	Japanese Diet approves Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
1979	SALT II pact announced.
1982	Strategic arms reduction treaty (START) talks proposed.
1983	March 23: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) submitted; March 30: revised INF proposals; April 2: Soviet Union declares right to deploy INF systems in Asia to counteract nuclear weapons deployed around Japan; May 29: Williamsburg summit; November 23: Soviets walk out of INF talks.
1984	January: Conference on Disarmament Europe; April: Conference on Disarmament (chemical weapons); May: Updated hotline agreement.
1985	January: U.S., U.S.S.R. conclude preliminary talks on new arms control round.

Sources: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1983; U.S. Department of State, Short Guide to U.S. Arms Control Policy.

Appendix 3: The Military Balance in Asia

Non-strategic nuclear forces deployed by the Soviet Union are aimed primarily at the nations surrounding the U.S.S.R., such as NATO member countries, Japan and China. The 1983 white paper on defense, published by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), concluded that "it seems that the Soviet Union is trying to divide the United States and such countries to alienate them from each other by deploying a large number of such weapons, thus creating doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent among the West-camp nations within range of Soviet non-strategic nuclear forces."

Intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems maintained by the Soviet Union in Asia include the SS-20, a mobile missile with a range of about 5,000 kilometers, and the Tu-22M Backfire, a high-performance bomber capable of penetrating air space at low altitudes and high speeds. The SS-20 carries three MIRVed warheads. According to the 1983 white paper, 351 SS-20s have been deployed since 1977. Recent reports indicate that 144 are deployed in the Far East. Eighty of the more than 200 Backfire bombers are in Asia.

The Soviet Union also has deployed considerable conventional forces in Asia. Approximately 370,000 troops, 820 vessels displacing over 1.6 million tons and 2,100 aircraft are deployed in the region. Immediate potential threats are posed to Japan in the Northern Territories, where the Soviet Union has increased its number of MiG-23s from 20 to 40 over the last year. These air forces are supplemented by troop deployments, long-range 130 mm cannons and MI-24 Hind ground attack gunship helicopters. JDA concluded in 1983 that these deployments indicate the importance of the islands to the Soviet Union, but are also aimed at forcing Japan to accept the "established fact of the illegal occupation" of the territories.

Estimated Deployment State of Armed Forces In and Around Japan

Country	Troops (number)	Aircraft (number)	Vessels (number)	Vessels (tonnage)
Soviet Union (Far Eastern)	370,000	2,100	820	1,620,000
China	3,150,000	6,090	1,965	665,000
North Korea	700,000	700	490	66,000
South Korea	520,000	430	110	89,000
U.S. Forces in Korea	29,000	100		
Taiwan	310,000	480	180	86,000
U.S. 7th Fleet		230	65	670,000
Japan	156,000	350	166	232,000

Sources: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1983; U.S. Department of State, Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace.